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Abstract
With the current situation in Belgium as its initial focus, this article will examine the regulatory frame-
work that governs the use of mentally incompetent adults as living organ donors in Europe. Our survey 
of the national regulation of 22 countries will reveal widely diverging viewpoints, ranging from an abso-
lute prohibition on organ procurement to a barely restricted authorisation to retrieve even non-regenera-
ble organs. We also have a look at the way in which American and English court decisions have applied 
the best interests standard in an attempt to deﬁne the contours of acceptable organ removal from men-
tally incompetent donors. Taking the best interests of the mentally incompetent person as a yardstick, we 
suggest that legally prohibiting organ removal from mentally incompetents may be problematic, even if 
it concerns only non-regenerable organs, and that regulations should be reﬁned accordingly.
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1. Introduction: The Legal Situation in Belgium
On 12 February 2010, the Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics1 was 
approached with an unusual request by the federal government. Laurette 
Onkelinx, Federal Minister for Social Aﬀairs and Public Health, decided to con-
sult the Committee about, inter alia, the moral acceptability of the provisions of 
the Belgian organ transplantation law regarding organ procurement from men-
tally incompetents.2 Asked for the ﬁrst time in its history to give advice on an 
existing rather than a draft law, the Committee set out to assess whether these 
provisions might be ethically problematic. The law under consideration was the 
1) Two of the authors are members of the Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics. Opinions expressed 
in this article represent the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the 
other Committee members.
2) Letters from the Minister to the Committee, 12 February 2010 and 22 March 2010.
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Law on the Removal and Transplantation of Organs, enacted on 13 June 1986 
and partially modiﬁed on 25 February 2007.3
The Law on the Removal and Transplantation of Organs originally did not 
mention living donation by mentally incompetents but concerned only compe-
tent adults and minors. According to the general applicable provisions, that 
remain unchanged and are contained in Articles 5 and 8, organ removal from a 
living donor may be carried out only on competent adults who have given free, 
informed and prior consent, put in writing and signed both by the person involved 
and an adult witness. Article 6 states that, in case the organ retrieval could have 
severe4 consequences or concerns organs that cannot regenerate, it may be carried 
out only if the recipient’s life is in imminent danger and the transplantation of 
organs from a deceased person would not produce as satisfactory a result. In the 
original version of the law, living donation by incompetent adults was not 
addressed. Considering Articles 5 and 8 in conjunction, this type of donation 
simply was not allowed at all.
However, the law of 25 February 2007 introduced a new provision, explicitly 
allowing organ removal from adults who are unable to express their will due to 
their mental state. Curiously, the amendment was made to Article 6 and, conse-
quently, only pertains directly to organ removal with possible severe consequences 
to the donor or concerning organs that cannot regenerate. Under these circum-
stances, organ procurement may take place if the recipient’s life is in imminent 
danger, the transplantation of organs from a deceased person would not produce 
as satisfactory a result, and consent has been given by the legal or personally 
appointed representative (or, in case such a person is not available or does not 
want to act, a representative appointed in accordance with the provisions of the 
Belgian Act on Patients’ Rights of 22 August 2002). By implication, if these three 
conditions are met, organ removal from adults who are unable to express their 
will due to their mental state is also allowed if it concerns organs that can regener-
ate (even if this normally could have severe consequences for the ‘donor’).
On 9 May 2011, the Belgian Advisory Committee issued its Opinion, which 
unanimously considered the provisions on organ procurement from mentally 
incompetents in the Belgian transplantation law to be ethically unacceptable.5 
The Committee argued that the facts that not even a criterion of last resort is 
upheld, the intended recipient may be totally unrelated, no approval by an inde-
3) Wet betreﬀende het wegnemen en transplanteren van organen/Loi sur le prélèvement et la transplanta-
tion d’organes, available at http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&cn
=1986061337&table_name=wet (Dutch) and http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?lang
uage=fr&la=F&cn=1986061337&table_name=loi (French).
4) The French and Dutch versions of the law diﬀer slightly, in that the former only speaks about ‘conse-
quences’ (des conséquences) whereas the latter mentions ‘severe consequences’ (ernstige gevolgen).
5) Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics, Opinion No. 50, 9 May 2011. Accessible via http://www.
health.belgium.be/eportal/Healthcare/Consultativebodies/Commitees/Bioethics/Opinions/index.htm 
(in Dutch and French).
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pendent supervising body is needed, and transplantation may proceed even when 
the prospective donor faces severe health risks and indicates refusal, leave the door 
wide open for exploitation. At least in theory, the Belgian law currently allows an 
organ that does not regenerate to be procured from a mentally incompetent per-
son and to be transplanted into a total stranger or, worse, into the person’s own 
proxy, even if an organ from a competent donor is available, the incompetent 
donor would suﬀer severe injury, and clear indications of his refusal are available. 
The Committee made recommendations for revision, with some members favour-
ing a total ban on procurement of organs that cannot regenerate from adults who 
are unable to express their will due to their mental state and other members opt-
ing for the introduction of additional substantive and procedural safeguards.
Somewhat surprisingly, the publication of the Opinion was soon followed by 
the introduction of two separate bills in Parliament, one calling for a ban on the 
procurement of non-regenerable organs and one calling for a ban on the procure-
ment of non-regenerable and regenerable organs from mentally incompetents.6 
By their own account, these parliamentary initiatives aim to bring the Belgian 
transplantation law into line with international guidelines and, more speciﬁ-
cally, with EU Directive 2010/45/EU. If passed, the Belgian regulation on liv-
ing donation by mentally incompetents could swing to the opposite side of the 
regulatory spectrum, from the most permissive approach to possibly a categorical 
 prohibition.
With the current situation in Belgium as its initial focus, this article will exam-
ine the regulatory framework that governs the use of mentally incompetent adults 
as living organ donors in Europe.7 In our survey, we will concentrate on 21 addi-
tional countries: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom. In Section 2, we analyse the standards provided by interna-
tional guidelines. We ﬁrst consider the recommendations for the protection of 
mentally incompetent adults that pertain to the medical context in general and 
next turn our attention to the recommendations that more speciﬁcally concern 
6) C. Fonck. Wetsvoorstel betreﬀende het wegnemen van organen bij wilsonbekwame levende perso-
nen/Proposition de loi concernant le prélèvement d’organes sur des personnes vivantes qui ne sont pas 
en mesure de manifester leur volonté, 5 October 2011, available at http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/
PDF/53/1780/53K1780001.pdf; J. Brotchi et al. Wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van artikel 6, § 2, van de wet 
van 13 juni 1986 betreﬀende het wegnemen en transplanteren van organen/Proposition de loi modiﬁant 
l’article 6, § 2, de la loi du 13 juin 1986 sur le prélèvement et la transplantation d’organes, 11 May 2011, 
available at www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/dossier&LEG=5&NR=1024&LANG=nl (Dutch) and www.
senate.be/www/?MIval=/dossier&LEG=5&NR=1024&LANG=fr (French).
7) This article will focus only on mentally incompetent adults who have not been competent before. The 
situation of mentally incompetent adults who have been competent before (i.e., Alzheimer patients) is 
more complex, since in this case regulation will not only need to be based on the best interests standard 
but also on the substituted judgment standard. These standards may sometimes come into conﬂict with 
each other.
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organ procurement. In Section 3, we explore national regulations regarding the 
use of mentally incompetent adults as living organ donors. Our survey will reveal 
widely diverging viewpoints. Half of the countries under consideration have 
opted for a ban on the harvest of both non-regenerable and regenerable organs 
from mentally incompetents. The other half allow removal of regenerable organs 
from mentally incompetents under strict conditions. Of the latter countries, only 
four also authorise removal of a non-regenerable organ from mentally incompe-
tents. In contrast to current Belgian legislation, very strict requirements are 
imposed in the three other countries at issue. Subsequently, in Section 4, we have 
a look at the way in which US and English court decisions have applied the best 
interests standard in an attempt to deﬁne the contours of acceptable organ removal 
from mentally incompetent donors. In Section 5, taking the best interests of the 
mentally incompetent person as a yardstick, we suggest that legally prohibiting 
organ removal from mentally incompetents may be problematic, even if it con-
cerns only non-regenerable organs, and that regulations should be reﬁned accord-
ingly. We conclude that, while the current Belgian legislation is far too permissive, 
the total prohibition that is now on the table would be overly restrictive.
2. Living Organ Procurement from Mentally Incompetents in International 
Guidelines
Before analysing national regulations regarding living organ removal from men-
tally incompetent adults, we will focus on how mentally incompetents are pro-
tected in international human rights instruments and international transplantation 
guidelines.
2.1. International Standards for the Protection of Mentally Incompetent Adults
International standards for the protection of mentally incompetents have been 
developed in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2006 and entered 
into force in May 2008.8 The Convention invites the contracting parties to take 
all appropriate legislative measures to guarantee persons with disabilities eﬀective 
legal protection against discrimination and exploitation, to promote respect for 
their inherent dignity and physical and mental integrity, and to give them the 
opportunity to be actively involved in decision-making processes on issues directly 
concerning them. Similar objectives have been put forward in a draft proposal for 
an EU Directive on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons 
8) United Nations, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available at http://www.un
.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml.
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Irrespective of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation, which has 
been under discussion since 2008.9
More speciﬁc propositions can be found in the Recommendation Rec(99)4E 
on Principles Concerning the Legal Protection of Incapable Adults, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in February 1999.10 Apart 
from calling on Member States to develop a system of representation suﬃcient to 
guarantee adequate protection of mentally incompetent persons, the Recommen-
dation sets out general principles which are to be taken into account. Most impor-
tantly, it emphasizes that ‘in establishing or implementing a measure of protection 
for an incapable adult the interests and welfare of that person should be the para-
mount consideration.’ In addition, measures of protection should be proportional 
to the mental capacity of the individuals concerned and tailored to their indi-
vidual circumstances and needs. This implies that, with regard to every major 
decision aﬀecting them, their wishes and feelings should be determined as far as 
possible, the information provided should be appropriate to their level of cogni-
tive development, and their opinion should be given due respect. The Recom-
mendation explicitly states that, when their capacity permits them to do so, 
mentally incompetents should not automatically be deprived of the right to con-
sent or refuse consent to any intervention in the health ﬁeld. Although these 
principles are considered to be of vital importance, it remains rather unclear what 
they would amount to in practice in the context of organ procurement.
2.2. International Transplantation Guidelines
2.2.1. Non-binding International Instruments
Numerous international organisations have enacted guidelines for living organ 
donation. In May 1991, the World Health Assembly endorsed several Guiding 
Principles on Human Tissue, Cell, and Organ Transplantation, which were last 
revised in May 2010.11 Guiding Principle 3 sets forth some basic conditions for 
living donation. This procedure is acceptable only when the donor has given free 
and informed consent after having been presented with complete and under-
standable information on the probable risks, beneﬁts, and consequences of dona-
tion. The donor must be legally competent, capable of weighing up the 
information, and under no undue inﬂuence. As a rule, donors should only donate 
to recipients to whom they are genetically, legally or emotionally related. Guiding 
 9) The proposal may be consulted at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:20
08:0426:FIN:EN:PDF.
10) Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Rec(99)4E on Principles Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Incapable Adults, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/texts_and_docu-
ments/Rec%2899%294E.pdf. 
11) World Health Assembly, WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue, and Organ Transplantation, 
available at http://www.who.int/transplantation/Guiding_PrinciplesTransplantation_WHA63.22en.pdf. 
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Principle 4 explicitly considers the use of mentally incompetents as organ donors. 
It stipulates that, just as is the case for minors, no tissues or organs should be 
removed from a legally incompetent person for the purpose of transplantation. 
However, narrow exceptions may still be allowed under national law. In this 
regard, the commentary to the Guiding Principle hints at the possibility of dona-
tion of regenerable organs when no other suitable donor is available. Where 
national legislation would indeed allow organ removal from a mentally incompe-
tent person, speciﬁc protective measures should be put in place and the person’s 
own opinion should be given appropriate consideration.
The World Medical Association’s Statement on Human Organ Donation and 
Transplantation, adopted in October 2000 and revised in October 2006, under-
lines the need to ensure that the choice to donate is informed and free of coer-
cion.12 Prospective living donors should be provided with all relevant information, 
including information about the risks and beneﬁts of transplantation. In addi-
tion, special eﬀorts should be made to prevent undue pressure, for instance by 
guaranteeing that the donor’s consent is obtained by a physician who is not part 
of the recipient’s transplant team. The Statement emphasises that individuals 
incapable of making informed decisions, such as minors or mentally incompetent 
persons, should not be considered as potential living donors ‘except in extraordi-
nary circumstances and in accordance with ethics committee review or estab-
lished protocols.’
In 2004 and 2006 respectively, the Ethics Committee of the Transplantation 
Society issued its Consensus Statement of the Amsterdam Forum on the Care of 
the Live Kidney Donor and its Ethics Statement of the Vancouver Forum on the 
Live Lung, Liver, Pancreas, and Intestine Donor.13 These Statements recommend 
that the potential donor of a non-regenerable organ be provided with detailed 
information regarding the health, psychological, economic, and social risks of the 
surgical procedure, the expected transplant outcomes for the intended recipient, 
and the alternative therapies available. In addition, all potential donors should 
undergo prior psychosocial screening and the consent procedure should incor-
porate mechanisms to evaluate whether the donor understands the information 
and decides voluntarily. Eﬀorts should be made to ensure that the information is 
provided and the assessments are made by health care professionals who are not 
involved in the care of the recipient. Finally, safeguards should be implemented to 
enhance autonomous decision-making and after consent has been given, absolute 
12) http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/t7/index.html. See also the October 2007 World 
Medical Association’s Statement on human tissue for transplantation, available at http://www.wma.net/
en/30publications/10policies/t6/index.html. 
13) The Ethics Committee of the Transplantation Society, “The Consensus Statement of the Amsterdam 
Forum on the Care of the Live Kidney Donor”, Transplantation 78(4) (2004) 491-492; The Ethics Com-
mittee of the Transplantation Society, “The Ethics Statement of the Vancouver Forum on the Live Lung, 
Liver, Pancreas, and Intestine Donor”, Transplantation 81(10) (2006) 1386-1387.
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freedom to withdraw at any time prior to removal should be guaranteed. The 
Consensus Statement of the Amsterdam Forum on the Care of the Live Kidney 
Donor implicitly recommends that mentally incompetents not be used as living 
kidney donors, since they are incapable of giving true informed consent. Rather 
surprisingly, the Ethics Statement of the Vancouver Forum on the Live Lung, 
Liver, Pancreas, and Intestine Donor leaves the door open for the removal of 
non-regenerable organs that may cause more severe health risks to the donor. 
According to the Statement, mentally incompetents should not be used as living 
lung, liver, pancreas or intestine donors, but in rare instances this might still be 
 considered.
In May 2008, the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Traﬃcking and Transplant 
Tourism was adopted under the aegis of the Transplantation Society and the Inter-
national Society of Nephrology.14 Apart from suggesting strategies to increase the 
donor pool, to optimise transplantation programmes, and to prevent organ traf-
ﬁcking, transplant commercialism, and transplant tourism, the Declaration calls 
for universal implementation of the recommendations of the Amsterdam and 
Vancouver Forums. The Declaration makes only broad suggestions and has no 
immediate bearing on the position of mentally incompetent living donors.
2.2.2. Binding International Instruments
Although the guidelines, statements, and declarations have considerably inﬂu-
enced national legislation, professional codes, and transplantation policies, they 
are not directly binding on those to whom they are addressed. By contrast, the 
European Union and the Council of Europe have adopted instruments that are 
legally binding on the contracting states.
The Directive 2010/45/EU on Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs 
Intended for Transplantation, approved by the European Parliament on 7 July 
2010, contains some general principles regarding living organ donation, although 
its primary objective is to establish an eﬀective framework for quality and safety 
of human organs. It calls on European Union Member States to take all necessary 
measures to guarantee the highest possible protection of living donors, to ensure 
that living donation is voluntary and unpaid, and to allow living organ procure-
ment only after all national requirements relating to consent and authorization 
have been met. More speciﬁcally, the Directive, in its (non-binding) preamble, 
requires that the potential living donor should be informed in advance about the 
purpose and nature of the donation, the consequences, and the risks, and that she 
has to be able to make an independent decision on the basis of this information. 
Moreover, living donations have to be performed in a manner that minimises the 
health, psychological and social risks to the donor and also does not jeopardise 
14) “The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Traﬃcking and Transplant Tourism”, Nephrology Dialysis and 
Transplantation 23 (2008) 3375-3380.
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the public’s trust in the healthcare community.15 As usual, the implementation of 
these general principles is left to the discretion of the individual Member States. 
The Directive oﬀers no speciﬁc guidance on the topic of living donation by men-
tally incompetents.
A more detailed framework is sketched in the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, which was adopted by the Council of Europe on 4 April 1997 and 
entered into force on 1 December 1999.16 As a general rule, Article 19, paragraph 
1 states that the removal of organs or tissue from living donors for transplantation 
purposes ‘may be carried out solely for the therapeutic beneﬁt of the recipient and 
where there is no suitable organ or tissue available from a deceased person and no 
other alternative therapeutic method of comparable eﬀectiveness.’ Article 19, 
paragraph 2 requires prior consent by the potential living donor, given both free 
and informed, expressly and speciﬁcally, either in writing or before an oﬃcial 
body. In accordance with Article 5, this consent must be preceded by disclosure 
of appropriate information about the purpose, nature, consequences, and risks of 
the intervention, and may be freely withdrawn at any time.
In January 2002, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine was 
complemented with an Additional Protocol on Transplantation of Organs and Tis-
sues of Human Origin.17 Apart from reiterating the basic principles already laid 
down in the Convention, the Additional Protocol contains detailed provisions on 
living organ donation that are considered additional articles to the Convention. 
Article 10 restricts living organ donation to persons who have a close personal 
relationship with the recipient as deﬁned by law or, in the absence of such a rela-
tionship, only to donations under the conditions deﬁned by law and with the 
approval of an appropriate independent body. In addition, Article 11 explicitly 
calls for an a priori assessment of the physical and psychological risks to the donor 
and prohibits organ or tissue removal if a serious risk to the life or health of the 
donor is indeed likely. With regard to the information to be presented to the 
donor, Article 12 speciﬁes that the donor shall also be informed of the rights and 
safeguards prescribed by law for her protection and, more speciﬁcally, of the right 
to have access to independent advice by experienced health professionals not 
involved in the transplantation procedure.
In addition to the Convention and its Additional Protocol, a range of motions 
have been adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe with 
15) Directive 2010/45/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on standards 
of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation, preambular para. 23 and Art. 15(1), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:207:0014:0029:EN:PDF.
16) The text of the Convention is available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164
.htm.
17) The Additional Protocol was adopted on 24 January 2002 and entered into force on 1 May 2006 
(after its ratiﬁcation by 5 parties). The text is available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/186.htm.
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a view to regulating living organ donation. Most important of these are Resolution 
CM/Res(2008)6 on Transplantation of Kidneys from Living Donors Who Are Not 
Genetically Related to the Recipient and Resolution CM/Res(2008)4 on Adult-to-
Adult Living Donor Liver Transplantation, both reaﬃrming the main principles of 
the Convention and Additional Protocol.18
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the Additional Pro-
tocol on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin are the only 
international instruments containing detailed provisions on organ procurement 
from mentally incompetents. As a general rule, Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Con-
vention, stipulates that medical interventions on a person who lacks the capacity 
to consent may only be carried for her ‘direct beneﬁt’. Consequently, as a cardinal 
principle, Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Convention imposes a general prohibi-
tion on organ or tissue removal from persons who lack the legal ability to consent. 
However, Article 20, paragraph 2 permits removal of regenerable tissue, provided 
that — in addition to the general provisions concerning living donation set forth 
in Article 19 — six cumulative requirements are met: (1) no compatible donor is 
available who has the capacity to consent, (2) the recipient is a sibling of the 
donor, (3) the recipient is terminally ill and the donation has the potential to be 
life-saving, (4) the representative or authority, person or body provided for by law 
has given free and informed, speciﬁc and written authorisation, in accordance 
with the law, (5) this authorisation has been approved by a competent body (a 
court, professionally qualiﬁed body or ethics committee),19 and (6) the potential 
donor does not object. Furthermore, in keeping with Article 6, paragraph 3, the 
incompetent individual should as far as possible take part in the authorisation 
procedure. Finally, Article 6, paragraph 5, provides that the authorisation may be 
withdrawn at any time in the best interests of the person who lacks the legal abil-
ity to consent. This stipulation indicates that the best interests of the person con-
cerned are of crucial importance when deciding whether or not to authorise organ 
or tissue removal. All these provisions are reiterated in the Additional Protocol. 
All in all, the Convention and the Additional Protocol allow organ or tissue pro-
curement from adults who lack the capacity to consent, but only if it involves 
organs or tissues that can regenerate and if seven substantive and four procedural 
requirements are met.
18) Available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Res%282008%296 and https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Res%282008%294. 
19) Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para. 129, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html/164.htm.
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3. Living Organ Procurement from Mentally Incompetents in National 
Regulations
3.1. General Considerations
We will now take a closer look at the way living organ removal from mentally 
incompetents is regulated in the countries under consideration. Before proceed-
ing, it is important to note that a wide variety of legal and non-statutory instru-
ments pertaining to living organ donation may exist at the national level. As a 
rule, living donation is regulated by parliamentary acts, often supplemented by 
executive decrees. Across national regulations, considerable diﬀerences may be 
observed regarding the level of detail of the legal dispositions, with some coun-
tries having enacted only minimal standards while others have opted for compre-
hensive and detailed provisions. Especially in the former case, living organ 
donation may also be governed by binding or non-binding guidelines elaborated 
by national health or transplant authorities or by codes of practice or ethical 
guidelines developed within the context of a professional association or an ethics 
committee on the national, regional or hospital level. In Austria and Ireland, no 
legal instruments regarding living organ donation have been adopted.20 In all 
other countries under consideration, living organ donation is regulated in a trans-
plantation law.21
Moreover, any analysis of the national regulatory framework is also compli-
cated by the uneven ratiﬁcation of the Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine and its Additional Protocol. To this day, the Convention has only been 
ratiﬁed by 29 of the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe.22 Of the coun-
tries under consideration here, 11 have ratiﬁed the Convention.23 The ratiﬁcation 
rate of the Additional Protocol is even considerably lower, with only 12 of the 
aforementioned 29 Member States having taken such an initiative.24 Of the coun-
tries that we will examine, only four have ratiﬁed the Additional Protocol.25
20) With regard to Austria, procedural requirements are listed in a position paper on living donation issued 
in 2005 by the Advisory Committee on Transplantation of the Österreichisches Bundesinstitut für Gesund-
heitswesen. See Lebendspende: Positionspapier des am ÖBIG eingerichteten Transplantationsbeirates, avail-
able at http://www.goeg.at/cxdata/media/download/berichte/Positionspapier_zur_Lebendspende2005.
pdf. In Ireland, they are clearly spelled out in the ethical guidelines drafted for the Irish Living Donation 
Programme, pending the adoption of the Human Tissue Bill.
21) See the listing of relevant national legal instruments at the end of this article.
22) An up-to-date list of ratiﬁcations can be consulted at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=164&CM=8&DF=18/02/2012&CL=ENG.
23) Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain, and Switzerland.
24) An up-to-date list of ratiﬁcations can be consulted at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=186&CM=8&DF=18/02/2012&CL=ENG.
25) Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Switzerland.
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In countries that have ratiﬁed, the provisions of the Convention (and, as the 
case may be, those of the Additional Protocol) are to be given eﬀect as national 
regulation.26 Domestic law and practices may comply with the Convention by 
adapting existing legislation or enacting new legislation. However, even in the 
absence of any formal way of implementation, it should be noted that a number 
of provisions would, under the constitutional law of the ratifying Member States, 
qualify as directly applicable, namely those conferring individual rights that are 
unconditional, suﬃciently clear and precise, and do not call for additional 
 measures.27 In this respect, the restrictions on organ and tissue removal from 
mentally incompetents may be considered as directly binding. However, the 
direct applicability of these provisions does not imply that, in all ratifying Mem-
ber States, this type of organ and tissue removal is subject to exactly the same 
conditions as those set forth in the Convention. Indeed, by virtue of Article 27, 
parties to the Convention may always grant their citizens a wider scope of 
 protection.28
Concern for the personal integrity and dignity of mentally incompetents has 
resulted in the formulation of a range of diﬀerent proposals at the level of national 
regulation. Some impose a total ban on all organ harvests from mentally incom-
petents. Equally moved by a sense of obligation to help people in desperate med-
ical need, other national regulations allow organ procurement when the foreseeable 
risks to the mentally incompetent organ source are very limited and the potential 
beneﬁts to the intended recipient are huge. A few allow organ removal from a 
mentally incompetent person even if it could entail more than minimal risk, if 
the psychosocial beneﬁts she would likely receive from providing an organ can 
reasonably be expected to signiﬁcantly outweigh the risks, and if several addi-
tional threshold requirements are satisﬁed. In sum, in the countries under consid-
eration here, living organ donation by incompetent adults is regulated in very 
heterogeneous ways, ranging from an absolute prohibition on organ procurement 
to a barely restricted authorisation to retrieve even non-regenerable organs. We 
will examine this continuum by proceeding from the most restrictive to the most 
permissive approach.
3.2. Countries that Prohibit Procurement of Both Regenerable and Non- regenerable 
Organs
In ten of the 21 countries that we have analysed, procurement of both regenerable 
and non-regenerable organs from mentally incompetent adults is prohibited. This 
26) See the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Art. 1 and the Explanatory Report to the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para. 20.
27) See the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para. 20. See also 
the legal doctrine on the eﬀect of European law on domestic law as, elaborated in the judgments of the 
Court of Justice with respect to European Union law.
28) See the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, paras. 161-162.
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is the case for Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Poland, Romania, and Spain, and may also be the future solution favoured by the 
Belgian legislator. In Austria, Denmark, and Germany, the legal prohibition is 
implicit, in that mentally incompetents are not capable of fulﬁlling the necessary 
requirement of informed consent. In Italy, Luxembourg, and Poland, the ban is 
more explicit, in that a living donor has to be in full possession of her mental 
faculties. In Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Spain, the law contains a speciﬁc 
provision prohibiting the use of mentally incompetents as living organ donors. It 
is interesting to note that Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Romania, and Spain have 
all ratiﬁed the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine but have opted 
for much stricter regulation, prohibiting even the procurement of regenerable 
organs from mentally incompetents.
3.3. Countries that Allow Procurement of Regenerable Organs Only
Eight of the 21 countries under consideration only allow removal of regenerable 
organs from mentally incompetent adults. This is the case for the Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland. 
With the exception of The Netherlands, all of these countries have ratiﬁed the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Finland, Hungary, and Switzer-
land have also ratiﬁed the Additional Protocol on Transplantation of Organs and 
Tissues of Human Origin. Although few of these ratifying states have amended 
their transplantation laws accordingly, possible additional requirements listed in 
the Convention and the Additional Protocol are applicable. Because the Dutch 
transplantation law coincidentally also seems to closely resemble the Convention 
in this regard, the provisions on the procurement of regenerable organs from 
mentally incompetents are very similar in all eight countries.
Several substantive requirements apply to living donation in general. Accord-
ingly, removal of a regenerable organ from a mentally incompetent adult is allowed 
only for the therapeutic beneﬁt of an intended recipient, if no suitable cadaveric 
organ is available, and if no alternative therapeutic treatment of comparable eﬀective-
ness exists. In the case of mentally incompetent organ donors, the criterion of last 
resort is supplemented with the additional requirement that no compatible compe-
tent living donor is available.
The next two requirements aim at guaranteeing a reasonable beneﬁt-to-risk 
ratio, considering that mentally incompetents do not have the ability to autono-
mously accept a low beneﬁt-to-risk balance. First, mentally incompetents may 
only be considered as donors if the intended recipient is in mortal danger and the 
transplantation has the potential to be life-saving. Exposing a vulnerable person to 
such an intrusive medical procedure merely to improve the quality of life of a 
third party is clearly deemed unacceptable. Second, organ harvest from mentally 
incompetents is only allowed if the health risks to the donor are reasonable. Although 
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this requirement also applies to competent donors, the acceptable maximum 
threshold of anticipated risk will have to be considerably lower in case of incom-
petent donors. In the eight countries under consideration, this line of reasoning 
helps to explain why removal of a non-regenerable organ may be carried out on 
competent but not on incompetent donors.
As an additional requirement, procurement of a regenerable organ may only be 
carried out if the mentally incompetent person herself will psychologically beneﬁt 
from the intervention. This condition is explicitly mentioned in the Dutch trans-
plantation law, where it is stated that the mentally incompetent person must have 
a personal and keen interest in the continued survival of the intended recipient. 
Although the legislations of the seven other countries do not contain a similar 
provision, the requirement that the transplant procedure should be of psycho-
logical beneﬁt to the mentally incompetent donor may be inferred from Article 6, 
paragraph 5 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.29
The need for psychological beneﬁt is also implied by the condition that men-
tally incompetents may only donate to a recipient with whom they are closely 
related, on the assumption that the interests of the mentally incompetents would 
be severely compromised by the death of a person with whom they presumably 
have a high degree of emotional intimacy. As to the nature of acceptable relation-
ships between recipients and mentally incompetent donors, some variation exists. 
All countries allow organ removal from a mentally incompetent person for the 
beneﬁt of her sibling. In The Netherlands and Switzerland, donation to a parent or 
a child is also allowed. The transplantation law of Norway exceptionally even 
allows more distant relatives to be considered as recipients. In France, donation 
to a cousin, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece is envisaged but, surprisingly, parents 
and children are not explicitly mentioned. However, the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine only mentions siblings as an acceptable category of 
recipients. Although parents and children may possibly also be considered per-
missible, since they are relatives of a closer degree of consanguinity, this probably 
will not be the case for more distant relatives.
In addition, the transplant legislation in the countries under consideration also 
contains procedural requirements intended to protect the mentally incompetent 
organ donor. First, the guardian of the mentally incompetent person has to give 
free and informed authorisation. Second, the potential donor should as far as pos-
sible be consulted. It will thus be necessary to explain to her the signiﬁcance and 
29) A medical intervention involving mentally incompetents should only be allowed if this is in their 
interests. In case of organ removal, this deliberation will be central to the authorisation process where 
the fulﬁlment of all substantive requirements is evaluated. Since organ removal cannot be to the thera-
peutic beneﬁt of the mentally incompetent person, her interests will only be served if she will likely gain 
psychological beneﬁt from saving the intended recipient. See Explanatory Report to the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, para. 48, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/
Html/164.htm.
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circumstances of the organ removal and subsequently to obtain her opinion. If 
there is an indication of refusal, organ removal must not be carried out. Third, an 
independent competent body has to give ﬁnal authorisation. In the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, this decision is taken by the pluridisciplinary living donor commis-
sions. In Norway, additional permission by a County Medical Oﬃcer has to be 
obtained. In France and The Netherlands ﬁnal decision-making authority is del-
egated to a judge, in Finland and Portugal a professionally qualiﬁed body at the 
national level is petitioned, and in Switzerland an independent authority, that 
may be either a court or a Guardianship Supervisory Authority,30 has to grant 
ﬁnal approval.
3.4. Countries that Allow Procurement of Both Regenerable and Non-regenerable 
Organs
Removal of a non-regenerable organ from a mentally incompetent person is 
allowed in four European countries only. Apart from Belgium, where the current 
regulation is extremely permissive, as noted earlier, this is the case for Ireland, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
In Ireland, organ procurement from mentally incompetents is currently 
governed by a set of ethical guidelines drafted for the Irish Living Donation 
 Programme.31 The principles embodied in these guidelines have greatly inspired 
the legal provisions envisaged in the draft Human Tissue Bill and the draft Men-
tal Capacity Bill, which are pending adoption.32 Both the guidelines and the 
draft Bills allow procurement of regenerable and non-regenerable organs from 
mentally incompetents but subject this to severe restrictions.
Several of these restrictions also apply to living donation in general. For 
instance, it is required that the proposed organ removal solely aims at the thera-
peutic beneﬁt of an intended recipient and that no cadaveric organs or therapeu-
tic alternatives of comparable eﬀectiveness are available. Other criteria focus on 
the need for adequate substitute decision-making in the absence of the donor’s 
ability to provide informed consent. In this case, free, informed, and written 
proxy consent has to be provided by the incompetent’s personal guardian or a 
person conferred with enduring power of attorney. These decision-makers should 
30) The Swiss transplantation law stipulates that it is up to each canton to establish the independent body 
and regulate the procedure. The explanatory report to the Swiss transplantation law clariﬁes that the func-
tion of the independent body could be performed by either a civil court or a Guardianship Supervisory 
Authority. In practice, a wide range of bodies have been selected, varying from one canton to another. 
We would like to thank Dr. Bianka Dörr (Senior lecturer in Private Law at the University of Zurich) for 
providing this information.
31) We would like to thank Dr. Sióbhan O’Sullivan (Lecturer in Healthcare Ethics and Law at the Royal 
College of Surgeons of Ireland, Dublin) for providing this information.
32) See Draft Proposals for General Scheme of the Human Tissue Bill 2009, available at http://www.dohc.
ie/consultations/closed/human_tissue_bill/draft_proposals.pdf?direct=1; Scheme of Mental Capacity Bill 
2008, available at http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Scheme_of_Mental_Capacity_Bill_2008. 
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seek the active assent of the person concerned to the greatest extent possible and 
may not authorise organ removal if she is unwilling. After proxy consent has been 
given and assent has been secured, authorisation from the High Court has to be 
obtained. Both the decision-makers and the High Court may only approve organ 
removal if they are convinced that this procedure would be in the incompetent 
donor’s overall best interests. In addition, several requirements are introduced 
that are more strict than those regarding organ donation by competent persons. 
For instance, the ethical guidelines stipulate that organ removal from a mentally 
incompetent person may be allowed only if there is no competent donor avail-
able and if the proposed transplant will be of great beneﬁt to the recipient and 
would entail only minimal risk and discomfort to the donor. With regard to the 
nature of the permissible relationship between the donor and the recipient, it is 
made clear that organ removal is only acceptable for the beneﬁt of a recipient 
with whom the mentally incompetent donor has an intimate relationship (i.e., a 
sibling or a parent), whereas in case of living donation by competent adults there 
is only a preference for a recipient with whom the donor has a close personal 
 relationship.
Both the guidelines and draft Bills in Ireland leave the door open for kidney 
removal from mentally incompetents. Although, as of now, such a case has yet to 
arise, it is deemed that even this kind of organ harvest may under exceptional 
circumstances be in the best interests of the incapacitated adult and that this is a 
matter for the High Court to decide on a case-by-case basis.
In Sweden, organ removal from mentally incompetents is regulated by the 
Transplantation Law of 1995. This Law allows the removal of both regenerable 
and non-regenerable organs if several requirements are met. Like all other types 
of living donation, the procedure is not allowed if it can be expected to cause seri-
ous danger to the donor’s health. In contrast to living donation by competent 
adults — which is allowed if the donor has given informed consent and, in case 
of non-regenerable organs, stands in a particularly close relationship with the 
prospected recipient or provides convincing reasons to allow living unrelated 
donation — much stricter provisions apply when the intended donor is mentally 
incompetent. This kind of organ procurement is allowed only if no suitable organ 
from another person is available, if the mentally incompetent person is related to 
the proposed recipient, if her legal guardian gives free and informed proxy con-
sent, and if there is no indication that the intervention would be against her will. 
The Law also requires prior permission from the National Board of Health and 
Welfare. This authorization may be granted only if the donor’s transplant surgeon 
agrees and, in the case of removal of non-regenerable organs, if exceptional rea-
sons make it appropriate.33 Guidelines issued by the National Board of Health 
and Welfare stipulate that serious danger to the recipient’s life or health may be 
33) Lag om transplantation m.m. 8 juni 1995, §§ 5-8.
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considered an exceptional reason.34 Although the Law gives no indication as to 
how the National Board should reach its decision, it may be presumed that due 
to its speciﬁc purpose and the general obligation to act on behalf of the mentally 
incompetent person, the Board will only permit organ removal to proceed if it is 
convinced that this would be in her best interests.
In the United Kingdom, with the exception of Scotland,35 organ removal from 
mentally incompetents is regulated in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Human 
Tissue Act 2004, and the Human Tissue Act Regulations 2006/1659. In accor-
dance with the Human Tissue Act and its Regulations 2006/1659, a strict proce-
dure must be followed when organ removal from a mentally incompetent person 
is being considered. First, the case must be referred to the Court of Protection36 
for a declaration that the removal would be lawful.37 If court approval has been 
obtained, the case must be referred to the Human Tissue Authority for additional 
approval. In order to assist the Authority’s deliberations, a written recommenda-
tion has to be submitted by an independent Assessor, a professional attached to a 
hospital transplant unit with the responsibility to assess whether the requirements 
of the Human Tissue Act and Regulations have been met.38 The Assessor has to 
ensure that proxy consent has been given freely and on the basis of complete and 
intelligible information. The Human Tissue Act stipulates that, if all require-
ments have indeed been fulﬁlled, the mentally incompetent donor herself may be 
deemed to consent to the organ removal.39 Following consideration of the Asses-
34) SOSFS  2009:30 Socialstyrelsens föreskrifter om donation och tillvaratagande av organ, vävnader och 
celler, 6 Kap, §§1-2, available at http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/sosfs/2009-30#anchor_5.
35) In Scotland, organ removal from mentally incompetents is regulated in the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000, the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, and the Human Organ and Tissue Live 
Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006. According to these instruments, removal of regenerable organs 
is allowed if there is no other adult who could act as a donor, the removal involves at most a minimal fore-
seeable risk and discomfort, and the person concerned has not indicated an unwillingness to be a ‘donor’. 
Where these requirements have been fulﬁlled, the mentally incompetent person needs to be referred to 
an independent Assessor and ﬁnal decision-making authority is delegated to the Human Tissue Author-
ity. Removal of a non-regenerable organ from a mentally incompetent person is allowed only as part of a 
domino organ transplant operation (i.e., a transplant procedure during which an organ is removed from 
the recipient which in turn may prove suitable for transplantation into another person). Since this form 
of donation is not regulated by the Human Tissue Act, the procedure is not subject to approval by the 
Human Tissue Authority but is instead covered by the common law.
36) The Court of Protection is a specialised court established by the Mental Capacity Act for all issues 
relating to people who lack capacity to make speciﬁc decisions. It has the same powers and authority as 
the High Court, which dealt with these matters before the Act came into force in October 2007.
37) See Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 6 — Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Periph-
eral Blood Stem Cells for Transplantation, para. 93, available at http://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpolicie-
sandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code6donationofbonemarrow.cfm; Human Tissue Authority Code 
of Practice 2 — Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation, para. 50, available at: http://www.hta.gov.
uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code2donationoforgans.cfm.
38) Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 6 — Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral 
Blood Stem Cells for Transplantation, paras. 55 and 57; Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice 2 — 
Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation, paras. 62 and 64.
39) Human Tissue Act 2004, Sect. 6.
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sor’s report and the requirements laid down in the Act and Regulations, the 
Authority has to decide whether to approve organ removal or not. Permission is 
required from one of the Human Tissue Authority transplant approval teams in 
the case of regenerable organs and from a panel of no fewer than three members 
of the Human Tissue Authority in the case of non-regenerable organs.40
According to the Mental Capacity Act, all decisions involving an adult41 who 
lacks capacity must be made in that person’s best interests.42 Consequently, both 
the Court of Protection and, in cases approved by this Court, the independent 
Assessor and the Human Tissue Authority should make their decision as to 
whether to proceed with organ removal from a mentally incompetent adult on 
the basis of a test of best interests. Although the Act does not actually deﬁne best 
interests, it contains a set of key principles and a checklist that is expanded upon 
in the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice.43 Decision-makers are instructed to 
take into account all relevant factors that it would be reasonable to consider. They 
should try to ﬁnd out the values and wishes of the incompetent person and, wher-
ever possible, involve her in the decision-making process. Apart from the best 
interests standard, no speciﬁc substantive requirements are imposed — e.g. the 
absence of alternatives, minimal health risks to the donor, huge health beneﬁts to 
the recipient, close relationship with the recipient. However, it can be readily 
assumed that all these factors are given due consideration as elements that jointly 
determine whether organ removal may be in the mentally incompetent’s best 
interests.
4. The Best Interests Standard
In countries where organ removal from mentally incompetents is not prohibited, 
the decision on whether or not to authorise such a procedure should depend on 
a moral deliberation that focuses on their best interests. As we have seen, the best 
interests standard is not explicitly mentioned in the transplant legislation of 
countries that allow removal of regenerable organs only. However, an evaluation 
of the foreseeable risks and beneﬁts of the intervention to the incompetent is the 
purpose of several substantive requirements (e.g. health risks to the donor are 
reasonable, recipient has to be a sibling, and there is no indication of refusal). 
Moreover, Article 6, paragraph 5 of the Convention on Human Rights and 
40) Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulations 2006, 
R. 12(1) and (3).
41) It may be important to note that adults are deﬁned in the Mental Capacity Act as 16 or over, whereas 
the Human Tissue Act deﬁnes adults as 18 or over.
42) See Mental Capacity Act 2005, Sect. 1(5), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/
pdfs/ukpga_20050009_en.pdf. 
43) See Mental Capacity Act 2005, Sect. 4; Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice, Chapt. 5, available 
at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/protecting-the-vulnerable/mca/mca-code-practice-0509.pdf.
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 Biomedicine, to which seven of these countries are parties, indicates that in cases 
were all substantive criteria are satisﬁed, the ﬁnal decision should give due weight 
to the best interests of the mentally incompetent person.
To aid reﬂection upon the circumstances under which organ removal from a 
mentally incompetent person may be deemed to be in her best interests, it is use-
ful to examine some decisions from English and US courts, where the best inter-
ests requirement is more explicitly invoked and courts have been petitioned to 
authorise this kind of intervention.
The best interests standard has been applied in two famous cases regarding 
removal of a regenerable organ from a mentally incompetent. In Re Y, a case from 
1996, the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales was petitioned 
with a request to authorise bone marrow procurement from 25-year-old, severely 
mentally incapacitated Y for the beneﬁt of her 36-year-old sister P.44 Similarly, 
in Matter of Doe, a case that was decided in 1984, the Appellate Division of the 
New York Supreme Court was presented with a request to grant permission for 
bone marrow procurement from a 43-year-old, severely mentally retarded man 
for transplantation in his critically ill 36-year-old brother.45 In both cases, bone 
marrow procurement was authorised after it was established that the procedure 
would be of only minimal risk to the incompetent person, that it was the only 
reasonable medical option to save the sibling’s life, and that it would be in the 
incompetent’s best interests. The Courts argued that the survival of the recipient 
would plausibly result in important emotional, psychological, and social beneﬁts. 
As to Re Y, the High Court was convinced that the death of P would adversely 
aﬀect the level of care Y would receive from her mother. Moreover, in case of 
successful transplantation, the relationship with her mother and her sister would 
be improved due to their gratitude. With regard to Matter of Doe, the intended 
recipient was the incompetent’s sole sibling and the only family member truly 
involved in the placement and treatment decisions for the incompetent. Con-
sequently, the Appellate Court agreed that ‘the beneﬁts to him of his  brother’s 
future company and advocacy outweigh any physical and psychological risks.’
Although to date no request to authorise kidney removal from a mentally 
incompetent person has been ﬁled before the Family Division of the High Court 
of England and Wales, or its successor, the Court of Protection, it might be argued 
that on similar facts and following the same reasoning, this may be judged to be 
in the incompetent’s best interests under the Mental Capacity Act.46 By contrast, 
US courts have on several occasions been petitioned to permit kidney removal 
from a mentally incompetent person and have in their judgment invariably 
44) Re Y [1996] 2 FLR 787 (Fam Div).
45) Matter of John Doe [1984] 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (App Div).
46) See J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 424; S.D. Pat-
tinson, Medical Law and Ethics, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) p. 478.
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resorted to the best interests standard.47 In Strunk v. Strunk, a path-breaking case 
from 1969, kidney removal from 27-year-old mentally incompetent Jerry Strunk 
for the beneﬁt of his 28-year-old brother Tommy was authorised by the Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky.48 Similarly, in Little v. Little, a case from 1979, kidney 
removal from 14-year-old Anne, suﬀering from Down’s syndrome, for the beneﬁt 
of her brother Stephen, was authorised by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.49 
Both Courts listed similar reasons to support their ruling. It was pointed out that 
there were no medically preferable alternatives to the transplant, that the chances 
of obtaining a suitable cadaveric kidney were extremely remote, that the incom-
petent sibling was the only family member who was an acceptable match, that the 
estimated success rate of the transplant was very high, that parents and guardian 
consented to the donation, and that the incompetent donor had not been sub-
jected to family pressure when stating her willingness to donate.
However, what really persuaded the Courts was the assessment that the beneﬁts 
that the mentally incompetents would gain from the donation would far out-
weigh the risks they would likely face. The dangers of the operation were deemed 
to be only minimal and no psychological harm was said to be expected. By con-
trast, in view of the close relationship between the siblings, their concern for each 
other’s well-being, and the incompetents’ awareness that they were in a position 
to help their ailing sibling, according to the Court a refusal to donate would result 
in severe psychological distress.
Preventing the negative psychological and social eﬀects of the recipient’s death 
on the donor was the main focus in Strunk v. Strunk. The Court established that 
Jerry identiﬁed very much with Tommy, who was his primary tie to his family and 
one of only a few people who could understand his defective speech. In view of 
the fact that Tommy was Jerry’s only sibling, it was feared that in case of Tommy’s 
untimely demise and their parents’ eventual death, Jerry would be totally deprived 
of the intimate communication that was so crucial to his mental stability. Taking 
all these aspects in consideration, the Court reasoned that the transplantation 
would serve Jerry’s best interests, because ‘his well-being would be jeopardized 
more severely by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a kidney.’
In Little v. Little, the Court was of the opinion that, apart from the prevention 
of the detrimental eﬀects that would occur if the recipient eventually were to die, 
allowing transplantation would also signiﬁcantly increase Anne’s happiness. Cit-
ing studies of the psychological eﬀects on competent kidney donors, revealing 
‘heightened self-esteem, enhanced status in the family, renewed meaning in life, 
and other positive feelings including transcendental or peak experiences’, the 
47) In some cases courts also relied on the substituted judgment doctrine but only to substantiate their 
equity powers.
48) Strunk v. Strunk [1969] 445 S.W. 2d 145 (Ky Ct App).
49) Little v. Little [1979] 576 S.W. 2d 493 (Tex Ct App).
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Court stated that Anne would likely receive considerable psychological and emo-
tional beneﬁts.
Both Courts emphasised that the best interests test should encompass all fac-
tors that could inﬂuence the mentally incompetent’s general well-being. More-
over, in reaching the verdict, they had considered a whole set of substantive 
requirements.
Subsequently, in two other cases, kidney removal from a mentally incompetent 
person was denied because these requirements had not been fulﬁlled and it was 
assessed that, under the particular circumstances, the procedure would not be 
beneﬁcial to the incompetent donor herself. In In re Richardson, a case from 1973, 
the Court of Appeals of Louisiana declined a request to permit kidney removal 
from 17-year-old mentally retarded Roy for the beneﬁt of his adult sister Beverly.50 
It turned out that not all other siblings had been tested and that Roy was the clos-
est but not the only match. Furthermore, considerable uncertainty existed about 
the immediate medical necessity of a kidney transplant and the recipient’s medi-
cal prospects if she would receive a kidney. In 1975, in In re guardianship of 
Pescinski, a request to allow kidney removal from 39-year-old mentally incompe-
tent Richard for the beneﬁt of his 38-year-old sister Elaine was declined by the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.51 The Court noted that another brother who was 
competent, in good health, and not too old, had refused to consider donation 
because as a farmer and father of ten children he felt that the obligation to his 
own family prevailed. In addition, it found no indication that Richard had in any 
way agreed to the whole procedure.
In both cases, the Courts also relied on the best interests standard, but denied 
the claim that donation would be beneﬁcial to the mentally incompetents. In In 
re Richardson, the assertion that Beverly might well become Roy’s primary care-
taker after the death of their parents was brushed aside as speculative and even 
highly unlikely. Consequently, the Court concluded that ‘surgical intrusion and 
loss of a kidney clearly would be against Roy’s best interests’ and that the trans-
plant could not be approved. In In re guardianship of Pescinski, the Court empha-
sised that no evidence had come to light showing that the transplantation would 
serve any interests of the mentally incompetent person, let alone that it would be 
in his best interests. With this line of reasoning, and explicitly recalling that an 
incompetent should have his own interests protected and that certainly no advan-
tage should be taken of him, the Court determined that it had no power to 
approve the transplantation.52
50) In re Richardson [1973] 284 So. 2d 185 (La Ct App).
51) In re guardianship of Pescinski [1975] 226 N.W. 2d 180 (Wis Sup Ct).
52) See, however, the vigorous dissenting opinion by Justice Day, who concluded that kidney retrieval 
from Richard should indeed have been authorised.
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5. Reﬁning Regulations
US court decisions suggest that non-regenerable organ removal from a mentally 
incompetent person may, in exceptional circumstances, be in her best interests. 
As we have argued in detail elsewhere,53 contrary to what legislators in most Euro-
pean countries take for granted, a total ban on the removal of non-regenerable 
and — a fortiori — regenerable organs may not necessarily protect the interests 
of mentally incompetents. There may thus be good reasons to amend the regula-
tory framework in European countries so as to allow this kind of procedure in 
cases where speciﬁc substantive as well as procedural conditions are met.
In accordance with the general principle that organ removal should not be 
allowed if a serious risk to the life or health of the donor is likely, only an exten-
sion to kidney donation would be permissible. Contrary to the interpretation in 
the US court cases, the risk of mortality and morbidity from kidney donation 
appears to be too signiﬁcant to ﬁt the label of ‘minimal risk’.54 Nevertheless, in 
contrast to partial liver donation, which, in view of the medical risks involved,55 
ought to be totally rejected in the case of mentally incompetents, kidney removal 
does not seem to entail serious medical risks.
Second, the best interests standard should be clearly reﬂected in any regulation 
on this issue. Indeed, from a moral point of view, severely intruding upon the 
physical integrity of a mentally incompetent person for the beneﬁt of another 
person could only be justiﬁed if this would be the last resort to save the life of 
that person and if the dignity of the mentally incompetent person would not 
be compromised. The prohibition of pure instrumentalisation entails that, after 
the urgent medical need of the intended recipient has indeed been established, 
ﬁnal authorisation may only be granted if the intervention would also be in the 
interests of the mentally incompetent person. Since organ removal cannot have 
any therapeutic beneﬁt for the mentally incompetent person, it should only be 
53) K. Van Assche, G. Ginicot and S. Sterckx, “Living Organ Procurement from Mentally Incompe-
tents: The Need for More Appropriate Guidelines”, Bioethics 5 July 2012, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519. 
2012.01982x.
54) Segev et al. report a mortality risk of 0.031 %. See D.L. Segev et al., “Perioperative Mortality and 
Long-term Survival Following Live Kidney Donation”, Journal of the American Medical Association 
303(10) (2010) 959-966. As to morbidity, some reports estimate that the complication rate of donor 
nephrectomy is as high as 35 % with up to 7 % major injuries. See J.D. Kallich and J.F. Merz, “The Trans-
plant Imperative: Protecting Living Donors from the Pressure to Donate”, Journal of Corporation Law 
20 (1995) 148; G. Mjøen et al., “Morbidity and Mortality in 1022 Consecutive Living Donor Nephrec-
tomies: Beneﬁts of a Living Donor Registry”, Transplantation 88(11) (2009) 1278; A. Spital, “Ethical 
Issues in Living Related Donors”, in: W. Shelton and J. Balint (eds.) The Ethics of Organ Transplantation 
(Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2001) p. 103.
55) Merion reports a mortality risk of 0.2 to 0.5 %. See R. Merion, “Current Status and Future of Liver 
Transplantation”, Seminars in Liver Disease 30(4) (2010) 417. A recent review article reports a mortal-
ity risk of 0.2 to 2 %. See Y. Yuan and G. Mitsukazu, “Biliary Complications in Living Liver Donors”, 
Surgery Today 40(5) (2010) 411-417. As to morbidity, Yuan and Mitsukazu report a morbidity rate of 0 
to 78,3 %, depending on the criteria that are used.
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allowed if there is a signiﬁcant likelihood that she will accrue important psycho-
logical beneﬁts.
Third, the requirement that organ removal may only be carried out if it would 
be in the best interests of the mentally incompetent donor should be made more 
speciﬁc in order to preclude that surrogate decision-makers may let their assess-
ment of the incompetent’s likely beneﬁt be guided by their own opinions and 
judgments. In this regard, it has been argued that US courts allowing organ har-
vests from mentally incompetents have all too often applied the best interests 
standard as loosely as necessary in order to support their decision to help the 
recipient.56 In an evolution that was foreshadowed in the reasoning behind In re 
Richardson and In re guardianship of Pescinski, several critics have forcefully advo-
cated the incorporation of a clear and convincing evidentiary burden of proof.57 
Inspiration can be found in the clear beneﬁt standard, which has been elaborated 
and promoted by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Aﬀairs of the American 
Medical Association.58 Like the more general best interests standard, the clear 
beneﬁt standard holds that probable positive psychological eﬀects and potentially 
hazardous side-eﬀects may be characterised as important beneﬁts and unaccept-
able risks that may tip the balance as to whether organ harvest should be allowed. 
In addition, however, by prompting decision-makers to choose what clearly would 
provide the mentally incompetent individual with the most beneﬁt, the clear 
beneﬁt doctrine is explicitly intended to prevent their own subjective preferences 
from clouding their judgment. Therefore, the preferences of the mentally incom-
petent person need to be reckoned with, commensurate to her level of maturity. 
As the case may be, the incompetent’s ability to appreciate the medical condition 
of the intended recipient as well as any indications of a possible desire to help, are 
important factors to be taken into consideration. Most importantly, the contin-
ued survival of the intended recipient must be deemed essential to the mentally 
incompetent person’s general well-being. After all, only under these circumstances 
can the psychological beneﬁts that mentally incompetents would likely receive 
from providing an organ reasonably be expected to signiﬁcantly outweigh the 
risks. Thus, only in such cases could organ harvest from mentally incompetents 
be considered to be in their best interests.
Fourth and ﬁnally, if the highly beneﬁcial eﬀect of the continued companion-
ship of the intended recipient is the main criterion for authorising organ removal, 
limiting organ donation to a recipient who is the mentally incompetent’s sibling 
56) C. Cheyette, “Organ Harvests from the Legally Incompetent: An Argument against Compelled Altru-
ism”, Boston College Law Review 41 (2000) 465-515.
57) See for example L.E. Lebit, “Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors and Incompetents 
and Misapplication of the Substituted Judgment Doctrine”, Journal of Law and Health 7(1) (1992) 128; 
R.W. Griner, “Live Organ Donations Between Siblings and the Best Interest Standard: Time for Stricter 
Judicial Intervention”, Georgia State University Law Review 10(3) (1994) 610.
58) In its Report on The Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue Donors. See http://www.ama-assn.org/
resources/doc/ethics/ceja_3i93.pdf.
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may be too restrictive. Since the interests of a mentally incompetent person could, 
in exceptional cases, be severely compromised by the death of a non-relative with 
whom she has a high degree of emotional intimacy, the range of acceptable recip-
ients may need to be extended.
6. Conclusion
Across Europe, organ removal from mentally incompetent adults is regulated in 
very heterogeneous ways. However, with ten of the 22 countries analysed opting 
for a total ban, and a further eight only allowing procurement of regenerable 
organs, it is fair to say that the general approach is clearly restrictive. However, 
this restrictive approach may not always be in the best interests of the mentally 
incompetents. We have argued that regulations should be modiﬁed so as to include 
the possibility of non-regenerable organ removal from mentally incompetents in 
extraordinary circumstances. At the same time, robust safeguards should be put 
in place to prevent sacriﬁcing the integrity of mentally incompetents if compat-
ible competent donors are unwilling or hesitant to donate. Several substantive 
and procedural threshold requirements would have to be satisﬁed, in the event 
of which ﬁnal authorisation should only be granted, preferably by a pluridisci-
plinary independent body, if the psychological beneﬁts that the mentally incom-
petent person is likely to receive from the continued personal companionship of 
the intended recipient could reasonably be expected to signiﬁcantly outweigh the 
risks she will be facing. At all times, legal regulation should guarantee that the 
best interests of the mentally incompetent person are the ultimate  yardstick.
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Appendix: List of Relevant National Legal Instruments
Belgium: Wet betreﬀende het wegnemen en transplanteren van organen/Loi sur 
le prélèvement et la transplantation d’organes, Art. 6, available at http://www.
ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&cn=1986061337
&table_name=wet (Dutch) and http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_
lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1986061337&table_name=loi (French).
Bulgaria: Закон за трансплантация на органи, тъкани и клетки, 19 
септември 2003, Чл. 24, available at http://www.zdrave.net/document/institute/
e-library/BG_Health_Acts/Transplantations_Act.htm.
Czech Republic: Zákon ze dne 30. května 2002 o darování, odběrech a transplan-
tacích tkání a orgánů a o změně některých zákonů, § 4, available at http://aplikace.
mvcr.cz/archiv2008/sbirka/2002/sb103-02.pdf.
Finland: Laki ihmisen elimien, kudoksien ja solujen lääketieteellisestä käytöstä 
2.2.2001/101, § 3 & § 5, available at http://www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ/ﬁ/laki/ajantasa/
2001/20010101.
France: Code de la santé publique, L 1231-1 to L 1231-4 and L 1241-4, available 
at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃchCode.do?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA00000
6171033&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072665&dateTexte=20110516.
Germany: Gesetz über die Spende, Entnahme und Übertragung von Organen 
(Transplantationsgesetz) vom 5. November 1997, § 8, available at http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/tpg/gesamt.pdf.
Greece: Νόμος Υπ’ αριθμ. 3984/2011 Δωρεά και μεταμόσχευση οργάνων και 
άλλες διατάξεις, Άρθρο 8, available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/User-
Files/bcc26661-143b-4f2d-8916-0e0e66ba4c50/d-orgam-pap.pdf.
Hungary: 1997. évi CLIV. törvény az egészségügyről, 206, available at http://net.
jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=99700154.TV.
Italy: Legge 26 giugno 1967 n. 458. Trapianto del rene tra persone viventi, Art. 2, 
available at http://www.airt.it/pdf/Lex458.pdf.
Luxembourg: Loi du 25 novembre 1982 réglant le prélèvement de substances 
d´origine humaine, Art. 2, available at http://www.dondorganes.public.lu/fr/que-
dit-loi/memorial.pdf.
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Netherlands: Wet van 24 mei 1996, houdende regelen omtrent het ter beschik-
king stellen van organen (Wet op de orgaandonatie), Artikel 4, available at http://
www.ieb-eib.org/fr/pdf/wet-op-de-orgaandonatie-nl.pdf.
Norway: Lov 1973-02-09 nr 06 om transplantasjon, sykehusobduksjon og avgiv-
else av lik m.m., § 1, available at http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-19730209-006-
001.html#1.
Poland: Ustawa z dnia 1 lipca 2005 r. o pobieraniu, przechowywaniu i przeszc-
zepianiu komórek, tkanek i narządów, Art. 12, available at http://www.progenis.
pl/download/ustwa_tkanki010705.pdf.
Portugal: Lei n.° 22/2007 de 29 de Junho alterando a Lei n.° 12/96, de 22 de 
Abril, relativa à colheita e transplante de órgãos e tecidos de origem humana, 
Artigo 6.º, available at http://www.apav.pt/portal/pdf/colheita_de_orgaos.pdf.
Romania: Legea 95 din 14 aprilie 2006 (Legea 95/2006) privind reforma in dome-
niul sanatatii, Art. 144, available at http://www.cdep.ro/proiecte/2006/000/40/3/
leg_pl043_06.pdf
Spain: Ley 30/1979, de 27 de octubre, sobre extraccion y trasplante de organos, 
Artículo cuarto, available at http://www.aebt.org/web/info/ley30_1979.pdf and 
Real Decreto 2070/1999, de 30 de diciembre, por el que se regulan las actividades 
de obtención y utilización clínica de órganos humanos y la coordinación territo-
rial en materia de donación y trasplante de órganos y tejidos, Artículo 9, available 
at http://sescam.jccm.es/web1/ciudadanos/trasplantes/rd_2070-1999.pdf.
Sweden: Lag om transplantation m.m. 8 juni 1995, §§ 5-8, available at http://
www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/19950831.htm.
Switzerland: Loi fédérale sur la transplantation d’organes, de tissus et de cellules 
du 8 octobre 2004, Art. 13, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/8/810.21.
fr.pdf & Ordonnance sur la transplantation d’organes, de tissus et de cellules 
d’origine humaine du 16 mars 2007, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/
rs/8/810.211.fr.pdf.
United Kingdom: Human Tissue Act 2004, Sect. 6, available at http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/30/pdfs/ukpga_20040030_en.pdf; Human Tissue 
Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regula-
tions 2006/1659, R. 12(1) and (3), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2006/1659/made & Mental Capacity Act 2005, Sect. 1(5) & 4, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/pdfs/ukpga_20050009_en.pdf.
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Scotland: Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/asp/2000/4/contents; Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2006/4/contents & Human Organ 
and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006, available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2006/390/made.
